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Abstract 
Philosophers usually discuss responsibility in terms of responsibility for past actions or 
as a question about the nature of moral agency. Yet the word responsibility is fairly 
modern, whereas these topics arguably represent timeless concerns about human 
agency. This paper investigates another use of responsibility, that is particularly 
important to modern liberal societies: responsibility as a virtue that can be demonstrated 
by individuals and organisations. The paper notes its initial importance in political 
contexts, and seeks to explain why we now demand responsibility in all spheres of life. 
In reply, I highlight the distinctively institutional character of modern liberal societies: 
institutions specify many of the particular responsibilities each of us must fulfil, but also 
require responsibility to sustain them and address their failings. My overall argument is 
that the virtue of responsibility occupies a distinctive place in the moral needs, and 
moral achievements, of liberal societies; and this, in turn, explains why it now occupies 
such a prominent place in our moral discourse. 
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Introduction 
Philosophers usually discuss responsibility in connection with praise, blame and 
punishment. Analysis of responsibility for past actions is often traced back to Aristotle, 
inviting us to suppose that the concept of responsibility is relatively timeless. A related 
strand of philosophical discussion dwells on what it is to be responsible, in the sense of 
being a moral agent. Again, such discussion tends to assume that the concept of 
responsibility does not need to be situated historically.1 
It may be surprising, then, to note that the word ‘responsibility’ is rather modern. The 
English noun dates back to the end of the eighteenth century, so too its analogues in 
other European languages. Although the adjective has a longer history, it is only in the 
nineteenth century that the concept is drawn into philosophical controversies.2 Our 
philosophical discussions pose a puzzle, then. If the cluster of concepts associated with 
responsibility is as timeless as philosophers usually assume, why should a new word 
have been coined, and gained such currency? I would like to propose that this puzzle 
can be answered if we turn to a common use of ‘responsibility’ that philosophers have 
                                                 
1  Major discussions that combine these approaches include Wallace 1994 and Fischer and Ravizza 
1998. An interesting exception to such non-historicist approaches is Williams 1985, for whom blame 
forms one element of a distinctively modern ‘morality system.’ 
2  A detailed account is given by McKeon 1957, pp. 6ff. As McKeon acknowledges, however, the 
adjective may be traced back rather further – as early as the thirteenth century in French, and in 
medieval (legal) Latin in the following century (cf Bovens 1998, p. 23n2). Hobbes, for example, asks 
whether a member of an assembly may be responsible for its debts or crimes (1651, ch. 22, §§13, 
15); and John Locke speaks of potential borrowers as ‘honest and responsible (1691, pp. 234, 286). 
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tended to ignore: responsibility as a moral virtue, for which we praise some people and 
organisations, while we criticise others for its lack. 
My concern in this paper, however, goes deeper than this linguistic coinage, and beyond 
the connections between responsibility as a virtue and other uses of the term more 
familiar in philosophical discussion. This paper is written in the belief that 
responsibility is one of the central virtues of modern liberal societies. It is a virtue that 
we demand of both people and organisations – speaking of socially responsible 
corporations, managerial responsibility, individual responsibility and so forth. What is 
it, then, about our mode of social and political organisation that has made the demand 
for responsibility so ubiquitous and, as I will also argue, so inescapable? 
This is to pose a vast question: my reply is necessarily exploratory, especially because 
philosophical accounts of liberalism and modernity give no particular prominence to 
responsibility. Rather than turning to existing theories, therefore, I invoke features of 
modern liberal societies that are concrete, practical realities for all or most of their 
members. Nonetheless, I will suggest that two quite abstract points readily follow from 
these. First, responsibility is a virtue of a social order that is pervasively 
institutionalised, in a peculiarly self-reflexive manner. Second, this institutional fabric is 
the condition of our exercising responsibility as well as the reason for the virtue’s 
importance. I have argued elsewhere that liberal political theory tends to give 
insufficient weight to the institutional character of actual liberal societies (Williams, 
2006). Here, by contrast, I pursue a moral claim: that we, the members of these 
societies, are right to give such pride of place to this virtue.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I briefly examine the historical emergence of 
responsibility, and note that this does not explain the non-political character of most 
contemporary demands for the virtue. Second, I turn to the everyday meaning of 
responsibility, and offer a schematic account of what is involved in this virtue. I stress, 
in particular, that it involves responding to a whole host of normative demands, within a 
field of mutual accountability. However, as the next section points out, this poses a 
puzzle, in that so many factors work against normative consensus in modern societies 
and against normative unity in the lives of their members. In the fourth section, 
therefore, I seek to persuade the reader that we must turn to the institutional character of 
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modern societies to explain the possibility of responsibility; and in the final section, that 
this institutional fabric also renders the virtue of urgent importance to us. In a nutshell: 
Responsibility is made possible by the successes of liberalism’s institutional order; it is 
necessary both to sustain this order and to address its inevitable failures in achieving all 
that we demand of it. 
I The emergence of responsibility 
As indicated, philosophers tend to speak of responsibility as a property of all rational 
agents (‘responsible agency’), or as a matter of holding people accountable for past 
actions (sometimes termed ‘retrospective responsibility’). But there is another use, 
whereby we praise some people, and not others, as responsible. We also commend some 
collective agents, such as institutions, as responsible – thus one of the original uses of 
the adjective: ‘responsible government.’ In this paper I shall refer most often to the 
individual case, but also want to keep the collective usage in mind, since it turns out to 
be rather important for our topic. Accordingly, I shall often use the term ‘agent,’ to refer 
to both individual persons and collective bodies. 
The word ‘responsibility’ has a relatively short history. Its most important original use 
was in political thought and debate, for instance in the Federalist Papers (1787) and 
Edmund Burke (1796).3 Here, responsibility pertains to those who govern or to 
government itself. The Victorians invented and popularised the notion of ‘personal 
responsibility,’ a term also taken up in modern Christian ethics, where our personal 
responsibility before God has been much emphasised. Only in the twentieth century, 
however, has responsibility become a widely noticed and widely articulated demand. 
What significance should we attach to the newness of the word, and the fact that the 
virtue it represents has so quickly become important in so many spheres of our lives? 
                                                 
3  Here I am relying on the citations of the Oxford English Dictionary and McKeon 1957, pp. 23ff. As 
noted, the adjective does have a longer history. 
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There are two plausible directions one might follow, when confronting the prominence 
of responsibility in modern life. On the one hand, one might suppose that the virtue it 
names is unlikely to be new.4 There are good reasons for thinking that the values we 
associate with responsibility (reliability, judgment, initiative – more on these in a 
moment) have always been important. What is new, on this line of thinking, is its 
discursive importance: and the most obvious construction to place on this is that we can 
no longer take responsibility for granted – that we now have special reasons to notice its 
absence, or compelling practical grounds to demand its exercise. On this view, we might 
suppose that the circumstances of responsibility are enduring, though somehow 
sharpened by our contemporary situation. 
Alternatively, one might opt for a more thorough-going historicism about responsibility. 
One might argue that our modern emphasis on choice, or our peculiar reflexivity toward 
all values, institutions and authorities, create distinctive forms of agency. This has 
refashioned us as subjects (as Foucault had it), and created distinctively modern types of 
collective agency. As well as suggesting that responsibility has a special connection 
with modern conditions, it would imply that attributing it to agents in pre-modern 
conditions (or criticising their lack of it) is anachronistic. Such a thesis raises far-
reaching questions about the social construction of agents and actions, which are bound 
to be controversial.5 
Here, therefore, I restrict my claims to terms compatible with the first view. I will not 
claim that responsibility has not been exercised in former historical periods or in social 
and political settings radically different from our own. Nonetheless, I think we must 
take seriously the historical appearance of the concept, and especially its obvious 
significance to modern societies. The question is how we should explain the former, and 
whether the latter may be justified. To approach the historical question, I turn briefly to 
the philosopher who has said most about the history of responsibility, Richard McKeon. 
                                                 
4  Evidently, just the lack of a word to name a moral value is not enough to justify a strongly historicist 
position. Aristotle, for example, spoke of several virtues that lacked a name in his language. 
5  At least so far as individual agency is concerned: it is, I take it, rather easier to see that new forms of 
collective agency might emerge. 
Responsibility as a virtue 
6 
McKeon was also much taken with the newness of ‘responsibility.’ He argued that 
political theorists (not least John Stuart Mill) originally turned to the concept to avoid 
disputes about ‘freedom of the will’ and moral motivation, and to deal with issues of 
greater immediate importance, such as legal and representative accountability. This led 
to an ‘enlarged concept of responsibility’ that provides ‘a way to discuss moral 
problems of individual action, political problems of common action, and cultural 
problems of mutual understanding, without commitment to a single philosophy or to the 
expression of values traditional in a single culture’ (1957: 29f). Thus McKeon 
emphasises the secular character of responsibility: despite the resonance it also found in 
Christian ethics, it arose in political contexts of mutual accountability and continues to 
function in the absence of a single scheme of values. Theoretically speaking, 
responsibility takes us away from ‘moral metaphysics,’ toward problems ‘found in the 
circumstances and history in which the concept itself was formed’ (1957: 32).6 
Although this suggestion has not been influential in subsequent philosophical 
discussion, where questions of moral metaphysics continue to preoccupy, it does not 
seem unreasonable in itself. For my purposes, the difficulty is that McKeon connects the 
concept closely with political responsibility and the concerns of political theory. This 
seems to correspond to important historical usages of the word, its use by Hamilton or 
Burke, then by Mill or, later again, Max Weber. But why has the term become such an 
everyday concern? If we start with the political uses, one might speculate that this is 
related to the emergence of universal suffrage. Yet we most often use the term without 
particular reference to citizenship and its duties. What we lack, then,7 is an account of 
why this term has gained such widespread currency – to the point where responsibility 
                                                 
6  Or at least it should: part of McKeon’s argument is that we do badly to think of responsibility in 
terms of the problem of free will. In any case, the question of whether adults of sound mind are 
responsible by virtue of, say, free will does not help with the question of how some better exemplify 
responsibility than others, nor with how collective bodies might manifest responsibility. 
7  I need to make one central exception, a figure who will be unheard of by most readers. Geoffrey 
Vickers anticipates much of my argument, being an acute observer of ‘two familiar but staggering 
changes of the last hundred years. One is the escalation of our expectations; the other is the escalation 
of our institutions’ (1973, p. 11). 
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has become something that we continually demand of each other, and of the 
organisations amongst which we live. 
II What does ‘responsibility’ involve? 
If we turn to contemporary usage, many connotations of ‘responsibility’ are clear, even 
if it is not immediately obvious how they fit together. There is an element of reliability 
and commitment, of carrying on with something over time. There is a dimension of 
initiative or judgment: the agent can be trusted with something and to exercise some 
degree of discretion. There is an obvious point of connection between the virtue and 
retrospective responsibility, in terms of mutual accountability. This involves a readiness 
to identify with and answer for past actions or omissions, and to make up for these 
where they have proved faulty. In each case, we tend to have a particular ‘sphere of 
responsibility’ in mind. This certainly includes an agent’s previous actions but is 
typically more forward-looking, to some particular area of care and concern.8 This 
points to yet another use of the word: we sometimes use ‘responsibility’ as a synonym 
for obligation. Clearly, the virtue is closely related to conscientiousness in fulfilling 
one’s responsibilities. With some circularity, one might say that responsibility suggests 
an agent who lives up to her, or its, position within a division of responsibilities and 
within relations of mutual accountability. 
Given this complexity, there are many ways in which one might attempt to define the 
virtue. According to Max Weber’s well-known ethic of responsibility a person (above 
all, the political actor) ‘must bear the (foreseeable) consequences of his actions,’ which 
requires that he be able to face realities ‘with inner composure and calm’ (1919: 441, 
436).9 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘responsible’ as ‘capable of fulfilling an 
                                                 
8  Thus we may praise someone as responsible in two ways. We may say she is responsible per se. Or 
we might describe how well she performs a particular role – eg, ‘the responsible mother’ – and thus 
refer to a particular sphere of responsibilities. 
9  My translation. Weber writes, of course, in terms of Verantwortung and its cognates. In some 
contexts, as a referee for this journal has argued, this might be translated as ‘accountability.’ I retain 
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obligation or trust; reliable, trustworthy…’ Herbert Fingarette writes, ‘Responsibility 
emerges where the individual accepts as a matter of personal concern something which 
society offers to his concern’ (1967: 6). Clearly, each of these definitions captures 
something important about the virtue. For the purpose of understanding its significance 
to modern liberal societies, however, I propose to look at it in more schematic terms. 
The formula I would like to offer is this: responsibility represents the readiness to 
respond to a plurality of normative demands. These terms will not be of much 
assistance in judging whether any particular agent has manifested the virtue, as I will 
discuss in a moment. My claim, however, is that they will help us to see how and why 
the virtue has become so important to modern societies. 
The chief point I would like to highlight consists in the connection between 
responsibility and plurality – that is, the many different normative demands 
(‘responsibilities,’ as well as other requirements and desiderata) that weigh upon us. My 
basic reason for emphasising plurality is straightforward: in paradigmatic cases where 
the virtue of responsibility is demanded the situation involves plural demands. For 
examples: the professional trying to do his best amid various regulations and 
professional codes, short-term priorities and longer-term goals; or the anxious parent, 
trying to balance her child’s security with concern for its growing independence, 
juggling those concerns alongside duties in her workplace. Depending on the situation, 
there may or may not be serious conflict between these demands. But in every case, 
there remains a need to chart a course of action that will constitute as adequate a 
response to them as may be possible.  
Even as I say this, a straightforward objection may suggest itself. There are plainly 
simple cases of irresponsibility where an agent fails in a single basic duty, perhaps from 
sheer selfishness or utter thoughtlessness. (The babysitter who gets too drunk to take 
proper care of a child, the driver who omits a needed rest-stop.) I believe that we should 
regard such cases as derivative – that is, although they can be described in the language 
                                                                                                                                               
the conventional translation because Weber’s general concern is with the qualities of character 
demanded of the politician – above all, a sense of responsibility. 
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of responsibility, they represent a simplified usage that omits one of the concept’s most 
central features. Why else, then, should we treat plurality as central to responsibility? 
In the first place, it is difficult to make sense of the intimate connection between 
responsibility and judgment and initiative if we do not emphasise plurality in demands. 
If we were simply faced with single duties at succeeding points in time, responsibility 
would be literally too easy for words. The obedient and dutiful child is not yet 
responsible, at least not until she starts to exercise her own judgment; the well-trained 
animal never will be responsible. Compared with the agency of children or animals, two 
distinctive features of adult human agency (and of certain forms of collective agency) 
are crucial: first, the capacity to move between different frames of reference; second, to 
respond for past actions and plan future interventions. Moving between different 
situations, and moving through changing situations: both involve negotiating multiple 
normative demands. When we praise an agent as responsible we are describing a 
readiness to exercise judgment and initiative with regard to the (changing, variable, 
never entirely foreseeable) demands she encounters over time. 
A second basis for this plurality lies in the conflicting perspectives that recur in 
normative judgment. Even in quite simple cases the agent and those around him may 
differ or be uncertain about each party’s various expectations, priorities, duties, and so 
forth. There will thus be diversity of opinion and even conflict as to what should be 
done by whom – the more so, as we recall the extended timeframe that each negotiates, 
and the different fields of activity that each must traverse. (Again, the connection with 
retrospective responsibility is clear, as others hold us accountable for past actions. So 
too the connection to responsibility as a synonym for duty – only that ideas about our 
duties tend to be so multifarious.) Conflicting demands and conflicting interpretations 
of those demands are the basic stuff of situations where we care about responsibility. 
This poses inescapable problems for practical judgment. The responsible agent must 
negotiate particular, diverse and sometimes conflicting claims. Being concerned to 
reconcile these demands, she cannot treat all of them uncritically. It is not only that 
taking claims at face value (that is, as validly construed by those who place them, 
including oneself) would be a recipe for thoughtlessness. Even more important, in 
complex, on-going situations the claims upon us are never straightforwardly 
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reconcilable. This means that we cannot take them at face value – except at the price of 
forgetting or ignoring some of those claims. Rather than sheer selfishness or utter 
thoughtlessness, then, I am suggesting that the most consequential form of 
irresponsibility consists in simplifying matters by ignoring some normative demands.10 
We ask that the claims of the self, the claims of others, the claims of the situation all be 
responded to. Judgment and initiative, imagination and commitment are our resources 
for discerning and extending what is possible and appropriate by way of response – not 
just in terms of individual acts, but also courses of action or institutional policies. 
A third basis for plurality: the responsible agent finds herself amid many forms of 
partiality. We are used to associating responsibility with impartiality – one prejudice 
against responsibility is that it is a cold and impersonal virtue. But it is still true that 
claims of intimates, friends and family weigh on the responsible person. More important 
again are the partialities created by our institutional roles and affiliations: a manager is 
responsible for her employees, a teacher to his students, a club member to fellow 
members (this is part of what we mean when we speak of an area of responsibility). The 
responsible person must be a skilled judge of the particular relationships she has to 
others, the demands that each relationship poses, and the demands that others are 
entitled to make. The same is true of an organisation, which must constantly take a view 
as to the legitimacy of the many demands made of it. 
Finally, every responsible agent is firmly embedded in a ‘non-ideal’ context. Things go 
wrong and situations are complicated.11 We can add: agents do wrong and agents are 
complicated. Part of Weber’s well-known ‘ethics of responsibility’ was that the 
statesman (or in general, the responsible person) cannot simply rely on ‘principles’: 
others’ wrong-doing must be dealt with, and this generally involves compromises one 
would prefer not to make – actions and measures that would not be needed in an ‘ideal 
world’ (cf Weber, 1919: 440ff). Certainly, it requires complex judgments about how far 
                                                 
10  This claim might be supported by the many studies of organisational wrong-doing, from Hannah 
Arendt’s study of Eichmann’s conscience (1965) to Robert Jackall’s study of American corporate life 
(1988). See further Bovens 1998 on accountability within organisations. 
11  As Strawson put it in ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1962). 
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agents have lived up to particular or general responsibilities, and who should exact what 
sort of accountability (‘hold them responsible’). Responsibility is always a matter of 
living with agents as they are, as well as what they might become, and doing so in terms 
of one’s particular relationships and responsibilities toward them. 
In addition to this emphasis upon plurality, I have also selected some other terms in 
which to speak of responsibility. First, I think it is helpful to describe the demands upon 
responsible agents in the loosest terms: hence my term ‘normative demands,’ rather 
than, say, responsibilities, duties or ‘reasons.’12 Thinking about matters from the 
perspective of the agent herself, as well as those she (or it) interacts with, we need to 
capture all the prima facie claims which people believe should prompt the agent to act 
or judge in one way rather than another. Such claims upon our attention and concern go 
wider than many accounts of ‘morality’ or ‘reason,’ to include everything that 
participants or observers feel should matter to an agent’s choice. Naturally, these 
demands may not have the precise force they are felt to have, nor (if consciously 
articulated) the exact force they are interpreted as having. In some cases such claims 
may even be entirely factitious. Nonetheless, which of these claims or interpretations 
should really guide thought and action – this is something the responsible agent must 
negotiate with those around her. 
Second, following the derivation of the word, I speak of ‘responding’ to demands. This 
too is very loose. Evidently, what constitutes an adequate or appropriate response is a 
thoroughly normative matter, and often represents a difficult question of experience and 
judgment. (Some responses, such as denial or avoidance, are typically components of 
irresponsibility.) From the perspective of an agent interacting with many other agents, 
                                                 
12  Many contemporary accounts of responsible agency find its most distinctive feature in 
responsiveness to reasons (eg, Wolf 1990, Wallace 1994, Fischer and Ravizza 1998). When we judge 
an agent to be more or less responsible it seems fair to suppose that she proves more or less 
responsive to the relevant reasons – indicating another direct connection between the virtue and 
responsible agency. However, to note this connection is to raise a delicate question, beyond my scope 
here, as to whether responsible agency comes in degrees, so that human beings may be unequal in 
their moral capacities. However this may be, our judgments of people as more or less (ir)responsible 
certainly pronounce some as better than others in negotiating key areas of moral and practical life. 
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the question is: Who judges whether a response is fitting? Or: who is authorised to hold 
the agent to account? And on the other side, it must be part of the responsible agent’s 
task to render account – as to how she has understood the demands upon her, as to how 
her actions can be taken as adequate or appropriate responses to these. Naturally, these 
responses need not be articulated: an important part of accountability lies in accepting 
the force of others’ reactions (which, in turn, need not be articulated) and adjusting 
one’s actions or course of action to take account of these. (I make this last point to 
emphasise that responsibility is firstly concerned with actions, and only secondarily 
with articulations.) 
Finally, I believe it is helpful to think about responsibility in terms of ‘readiness’ – that 
is, both willingness and ability. When philosophers speak of ‘responsibility’ as a basic 
feature of normal human agency they generally mean something like the capacity to act 
on the basis of reasons (or, in my looser terminology, to respond to normative 
demands). When we use the term to praise an agent we are indeed partly concerned with 
his ability – hence the many variations in the intrinsic capacities of human beings and 
organisations. (Note, however, that abilities are also relative to the demands and 
possibilities of situations – as I will stress below, the ability to fulfil any complex task 
depends very much on one’s circumstances.) In addition, we are also concerned with an 
agent’s will to employ his abilities – that is, we are judging the extent to which he 
perceives and accepts his responsibilities. For our purposes, the phrase ‘holding 
someone responsible’ is somewhat misleading, because the virtue of responsibility 
involves what others can neither compel nor instruct: as Fingarette stressed, 
responsibility is about acceptance of the demands one faces. 
As indicated above, this is to view the virtue in highly schematic terms, to the point 
where it may seem wholly divorced from particular judgments of whether an agent – be 
it an individual or a collective – has manifested responsibility. This is deliberate. In any 
given situation – and especially, as I shall stress in a moment, amid the complexities of 
life in modern societies – it will be a matter of judgment both broad and deep, as to 
what demands really weigh upon an agent, and what sort of responses may be possible 
and appropriate. This question of judgment is fundamental to our subject matter: 
responsible agents can, and must, judge for themselves and with others. As such, an 
account of responsibility has to take seriously the capacity of responsible agents to 
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judge, and to judge one another. Nonetheless, if there is one thing that theoretical 
reflection can assert about this process of mutual judgment, it is that a whole host of 
diverse claims will be made of each agent: the responsible agent must appreciate and 
weigh these demands, and try as best she (or it) can, to negotiate an appropriate 
response to them. 
III A paradox of modern responsibility 
Why is responsibility no longer a distinctively political concern? The first stage of my 
reply was to examine some features of the virtue of responsibility, underlining above all 
plurality in the demands to which we expect responsible agents to respond to. Putting 
the matter slightly differently, we might say that responsibility is concerned with the 
sheer difficulty of maintaining and fostering human cooperation in the light of a whole 
range of limiting factors: the resources and attention that each agent can bring to bear, 
the competing demands on each agent, the diverging perspectives of plural agents, the 
limited but overlapping spheres of responsibility of different agents, and the 
complexities of mutual accountability amid non-ideal conduct. It is easy to see that 
these factors weigh especially heavily in political contexts. It is easy, too – in outline, at 
least – to see that they enter into the everyday lives of almost all the members of 
modern liberal societies. 
All accounts of modernity allow, even insist, that diversity of expectations and demands 
is especially marked in contemporary societies. At the widest level we seem to lack the 
fixed reference points that were present to pre-modern societies: religion, authority, 
nature, custom. To whom (or what), then, does the responsible agent take herself to be 
accountable, and on what terms? Moreover, a whole series of demands are placed upon 
each agent. Plurality is evident not only in the sea of voices announcing their 
expectations, but also with regard to the sources of those demands – not least, the many 
roles individuals take on or are landed with. Again, accounts of modern liberal societies 
agree that our modern situation presents a peculiar absence of fixity. Few are the roles 
we are born to; characteristically, even the most ‘natural’ or ‘involuntary’ roles are 
subject to loud dispute (what are the claims of family, of ethnicity or nationality, of 
humanity itself?). Many are the roles we choose: parent, friend, engaged citizen, job-
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holder, professional, and so on. Furthermore, many of these roles invite on-going 
renegotiation. Both choice and negotiation open up further fluidity, only increasing the 
plurality of demands upon the actor. 
This poses an apparent paradox. It is (one may say) all very well to stress plurality in the 
demands upon us. But it is equally clear that agents must be able to find some way of 
negotiating and reconciling this plurality. If an agent – whether a person or an 
organisation – were to acknowledge a mere sub-set of the demands placed upon her, 
responsibility would badly fail. Nor can the responsible agent act as if she were the sole 
authority as to the normative demands that she should honour, or we would lose the 
vital connection between responsibility and mutual accountability. 
In other words: Responsibility looks as if it has become all but impossible, at just that 
historical moment when we articulated the virtue and began to demand it of our 
institutions and ourselves. One way of understanding this seeming paradox would be to 
suggest that we have been driven to notice what has slipped from our grasp. The more 
plural the demands upon us have become, the more we have felt the need for the virtue 
which shows us responding to them all, each in its proper measure: thus responsibility’s 
place in political theory from Burke to Weber. As the expectations that modern societies 
place upon us – or that we place upon one another – have become ever more 
multifarious, shifting and conflicting, our demand for responsibility has become more 
widespread, but at the same time more unattainable. Unless there are resources that 
agents are able to draw on in minimising the plurality of demands upon them and in 
delimiting the plurality of voices that would hold them to account and judge the 
adequacy of their responses, then only pessimism will be justified.  
Many accounts of the modern age readily concur in such pessimism. Some 
communitarians – Alasdair MacIntyre is the best-known example – have doubted 
whether any virtue can be exhibited in an age of such moral fragmentation. The paradox 
that meets responsibility is actually the paradox of a society that talks of morality but 
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lacks the unity to sustain any ethics at all.13 Trenchant critique may also be found among 
Foucauldian writers, who discern disciplinary forces in our ideals, as elsewhere. Nikolas 
Rose, for example, writes of ‘responsibilisation,’14 inviting us to suspect that the virtue 
involves impositions which are far from innocent, and perhaps not even meetable. And 
although it is only one, rather untheoretical, element in such an argument, the 
prevalence of chronic stress among so many who work hard to meet all the demands 
made of them – and which they make of themselves – might offer persuasive evidence 
for this suspicion. 
Other writers may be more optimistic. Some liberals – Rawls is the most prominent – 
discern sufficient overlap in our fundamental values for us to sustain a liberal political 
settlement. Perhaps one might extend such optimism downwards, to our ‘politics of 
everyday life.’ In this case, responsibility would still be a task, but not an insuperable 
one. – While I would like to share some of this optimism – and must do, to sustain my 
overall argument about the rightful place of responsibility in our societies – I doubt that 
we can address this paradox of responsibility in terms of supposedly shared values, that 
prevent us from making demands of one another that are irreconcilable in their plurality. 
Responsibility is the moral child of highly differentiated, socially plural societies, and 
these societies give rise to astonishingly variegated and relentlessly specific moralities 
among their members. Even if there were some fundamental agreement in underlying 
values, this would hardly answer to the fragmentation in the actual moralities that we 
each encounter and act on in our daily lives. 
My own view, then, is that we cannot deny the lack of the fixity and coherence that 
distinguish our modern moral situation. Against more pessimistic perspectives, 
                                                 
13  MacIntyre 1981/4. Bernard Williams has made the related claim that the peculiar degree of 
reflectiveness of modern societies has lent ‘thicker’ ethical concepts less currency (1985, pp. 163f). 
Williams does not make clear the logic behind this contested claim. But it is more natural to think 
that greater social reflexivity calls not for ‘thinner’ but for more reflexive moral concepts – 
responsibility being a case in point. 
14  Rose 1999, pp. 154f, 214f. As with MacIntyre, my brief comments hint at only a small part of his 
case. 
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however, I think we should see responsibility as one of our most essential and 
constructive moral responses to this lack.15 Nonetheless, to understand how 
responsibility constitutes a tenable response we must also locate something that unites 
us – and something much more concrete than any supposed consensus in underlying 
values. (– Not even a consensus upon the virtue of responsibility: as I have interpreted 
it, responsibility may mean very different things to different people, depending on the 
demands we suppose any given agent to face.) In the next section I argue that this 
unifying factor is the stable, if contested, schemes of cooperation embodied in our 
modern institutions. That is, to explain the modernity of responsibility, and to show how 
we might overcome the apparent paradox it poses, we must relate it to our modern 
institutional fabric. The way in which organisations delimit the plurality of demands 
upon agents provides the key to our relative success in realising responsibility. At the 
same time, it explains why responsibility has become so important to us. 
IV What makes responsibility possible? 
My claim is that the central occasion for our discovery – or invention – of responsibility 
is the peculiarly institutional and peculiarly reflexive character of modern societies – not 
just in the formal political sphere, but across every field of life. As McKeon argued, a 
liberal political background is important to the genesis of responsibility, as power 
comes to be shared in and beyond representative assemblies. But this political origin is 
no longer evident on a day-to-day basis: we most commonly demand and speak of 
responsibility without reference to overtly political matters, and most of us bear quite 
minimal or sporadic political responsibilities.16 
                                                 
15  There are obviously many more, but most of these have been more widely recognised, and are more 
obviously political in character, than responsibility (eg, civic and welfare rights, toleration, or 
procedural justice). 
16  Of course, many think that our responsibilities in this regard are, or ought to be, greater than liberal 
theory usually takes them to be. Sympathetic as I am to this line of thought, it does not affect the 
overall point being made here. 
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However, our customary lack of political activity does not mean that we do not possess 
certain powers. In a liberal democracy it is a matter of course that important powers 
belong to a wide range of institutions – from schools to parliaments, corporations to 
charities. More, it is a distinctive feature of these societies, remarked on by almost all 
theorists, that we take it for granted that all our institutions can and should be remade to 
suit human wants and interests. Such attempts at change come not just from above (eg, 
the directives of government) but from below, through the actions of individuals and 
organisations, usually outside of formal political processes. For examples: citizens may 
form a new charity to address a particular social concern, or a regulatory agency may 
alter the liabilities of certain financial institutions. 
This self-reflexive web of institutions in turn distributes non-negligible powers to the 
huge numbers of people occupying roles within it. In this stunningly novel historical 
situation, the responsibility implied by power has become an intimate and universal 
concern – of the many vested with such powers, to everyone who is affected by their 
exercise. Responsibility is a central demand when we are granted significant discretion 
or power, wherever innovation, change, and fluidity rob practices of fixity, so that our 
mutual expectations require on-going renegotiation. This need to negotiate a plurality of 
demands is present to almost every member of our society, and in almost every field of 
life. 
There is obviously much to say about these facets of modern social and political life – 
facets, as I have argued elsewhere (Williams 2006), that are not sufficiently taken 
account of in contemporary liberal theory. But I think even these very selective 
comments allow us insights into responsibility omitted in contemporary philosophical 
discussion – or, indeed, taken as read in applied ethics, when we investigate the 
particular responsibilities of individuals or organisations. Amid this institutional fabric, 
a very large number of people are granted highly specific and delimited powers by 
virtue of the roles they choose or accept. These often include powers to redefine roles 
and relationships, even to reform institutions. These role-occupants are also granted 
resources to enable them to achieve certain tasks, as well as to reward them for their 
efforts. With power, accountability: Roles expose actors to accountability via specific 
channels, and often involve holding others accountable. Although many such 
interactions cross the boundaries of particular institutions, as when one agency oversees 
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another, or a body provides services to another, they are nonetheless channelled and 
delimited by institutional frames. 
In emphasising the institutional background of this virtue, I mean to argue that 
responsibility is a moral achievement, but that its basis is not to be found at the level of 
ideas or beliefs or ‘values.’ What is central is the moral division of labour created by 
our institutional fabric. This scheme of cooperation delimits the normative demands 
upon each of us, by defining particular spheres of responsibility. Given the fluidity, 
plurality and disagreement associated with normative demands in modern societies, this 
limitation is crucial. Without it, we would be left in a situation of paralysing uncertainty 
or desperate decisionism. When institutional fabrics break down, the result is clear to 
see: unable to respond to all the demands upon them, and deprived of organised 
channels for mutual accountability, people retreat into the local – closing off moral 
sensitivity by suppositious boundaries between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy,’ insider and 
outsider. (Similarly, when institutional fabrics are weak or near-absent, as in many 
international contexts.) 
At the same time as limiting the range of demands upon us, of course, our moral 
division of labour greatly intensifies others. As well as highly specific chains of 
accountability, agents accept highly specific responsibilities that could not even be 
conceived of without a very complex scheme of cooperation – from maintaining these 
railway tracks, to teaching this group of students, to defining the priorities of my 
company. Clearly, we are able – morally as well as practically – to attend to these 
because others have specific responsibilities for other matters, and often to check and 
counterbalance our own activities. My organisation can focus on profit because they are 
competing and he is regulating and they are enforcing, and so on. 
Of course, some of these realities are not entirely new. Deliberately created 
bureaucracies, for instance for taxation, are very old indeed. What is new, however, is 
the ubiquity of these factors, that they impinge in so many ways upon every member of 
the liberal polity. Everyone is aware of the artificial character of our institutions, and 
everyone aware of some entitlement, however minimal, to demand or contribute to their 
reform in the name of her own or others’ needs and interests. (Our willingness to apply 
categories of vice and virtue to our organisations is one reflection of this item of modern 
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common sense.) Similarly, we often contest the responsibilities attaching to individual 
roles. A series of empowerments enable us to do both: the privileges attaching to 
individual roles and positions; more particular, highly variable membership rights; and – 
not least – overarching legal and citizenship rights. In other words, politically secured 
rights – freedoms to associate, to found new organisations, to leave particular roles, to 
speak out – remain central to the operation of this institutional fabric and its successful 
distribution of powers. Hence the important coincidence between responsibility and the 
emergence of democratic government, notwithstanding the largely non-political 
character of most manifestations of responsibility. 
V What makes responsibility necessary? 
When moral and political philosophy are not idealising the rights and freedoms of 
modern society, their default mode is critique – a contrast I already drew attention to in 
opposing possible communitarian and Foucauldian perspectives to an (admittedly naïve) 
liberalism. In emphasising responsibility I mean to take distance from both tendencies. 
Striking as our freedoms are, our mutual dependence is still more inescapable. While 
liberal societies have sufficient failings to think complacency a real danger, failures to 
recognise these achievements are also common and problematic. The membership of a 
modern polity makes more extensive, variegated demands of itself than any other 
community in human history – the rights we are accorded, the material goods available, 
the powers and opportunities open to most citizens, would stretch the imagination of 
any previous generation. We achieve this via a division of responsibilities that is 
without precedent – not only astonishingly complex but also highly reflexive and 
responsive. 
In emphasising the virtue of responsibility, I am suggesting that this constitutes a 
specifically moral achievement. Despite the many centrifugal forces of modern 
societies, despite their materialism and inequalities, despite the currency of ideological 
or self-serving notions of freedom and autonomy – despite all this, it is striking that 
most of us not only depend on one another but act in ways that allow others to depend 
on us. Most people take on extensive and demanding responsibilities, and – to their 
great moral credit – many of them act responsibly, often across all the roles they play. 
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They thereby sustain a fabric of relationships and institutions that, for all the costs it 
may exact of us (– and of some far more than others, of course), channels immense 
energies toward meeting one another’s needs and wants. 
Of course, this division of labour is never perfect; sometimes it turns out very faulty 
indeed. That is to say: if our institutional fabric makes responsibility possible, it also 
continually demands responsibility of agents. One reason for this, regardless of any 
organisational gaps or flaws, lies in the essential connections between responsibility, 
commitment and judgment. However closely our roles and responsibilities are specified, 
and however tightly accountability is enforced, we still need to act so that others may 
depend on us, and to exercise initiative in balancing and negotiating the various 
demands upon us. But there are at least three further respects in which responsibility is 
always demanded, and which highlight its highly reflexive and mutual character. 
I have stressed that responsibility is necessarily connected with mutual accountability. It 
applies not only as we weigh demands, so as to be able to render proper account of our 
actions; it also requires that we be prepared to be held accountable for our actions; and 
further, to hold others responsible for their actions. How do agents become aware of the 
demands upon them? How do others’ expectations of us become expectations of 
ourselves? How are allocations of power and resources coordinated so that we can fulfil 
these demands? How is retrospective responsibility constructively apportioned? – Our 
institutions define roles and relationships, which in turn largely define who should hold 
whom accountable and in what regards – from the citizen’s duty to hold politicians 
accountable, to the regulatory agency’s supervisory tasks, to the employee’s need to 
stand up for her rights. These relations of accountability are, in turn, closely defined in 
their subject matter, modes of scrutiny, rewards and sanctions. Especially when roles 
are transgressed, however, it is often systematically unclear who is entitled to hold 
whom to account and by what channels. In the non-ideal contexts that we always 
inhabit, formally defined chains of accountability are never the whole story. So it is 
always possible that failings in others’ conduct will require responsible agents to step 
outside of these. 
A broader point relates to the demand that we be alert to responsibilities that fall outside 
of our roles. I have argued that responsibility is made possible by a highly sophisticated 
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moral division of labour, by the separation of different spheres of responsibility. But 
responsibilities are always liable to fall through the gaps; changing realities are always 
liable to disrupt existing divisions of responsibility; actual powers may be at some 
distance from notional responsibilities. Or in other words, if everyone merely ‘does their 
job,’ organisational irresponsibility may still result. In this situation we must all pick up 
the pieces, look out for unmet responsibilities – without falling into insubordination or 
otherwise infringing on others’ spheres of responsibility.17 Roles define and clarify the 
demands upon us, but they do not exhaust them. Not least, no moral division of labour 
can mean that the imperatives of basic human decency cease to speak; the responsible 
agent has these honour to honour, too. 
A third, overarching point concerns the definition and allocation of roles. As the 
responsibility of a role increases, an agent takes more responsibility for allocating 
responsibilities to others and negotiating his (or its) own proper sphere of responsibility. 
Managerial and regulatory roles, for example, often involve supervising the adequacy of 
an organisation’s or a sector’s moral division of labour; a parliament must reflect on its 
own responsibilities as a small company need not. How vital these tasks are can be seen 
when we recall that agents need to be faced with a manageable plurality of demands. 
One of the most common sources of irresponsibility, I have been suggesting, is the 
overloading of agents, presenting them with unmeetable or incompatible demands. 
Here, the temptation, even necessity, is to drop certain demands – to cut moral or 
procedural corners, to ignore demands not backed by compelling or short-term forms of 
accountability.18 And indeed, much suggests that many agents are overwhelmed by the 
plurality of demands upon them – to meet the targets, respect their subordinates, honour 
the law, and so on. Certainly, we are familiar enough with the irresponsibility that 
results; so too, with how one agent’s irresponsibility can set off a chain reaction in or 
beyond an organisation. In this situation, responsibility is continually demanded – not 
just of those who supervise and manage, but also of each role occupant – in assessing 
the extent to which roles are manageable and responsibilities properly allocated. 
                                                 
17  See Bovens 1998 on individual responsibilities within organisations. 
18  This can also happen when several different roles prove incompatible. The best observer of this 
problem is Chester Barnard 1937, pp. 263ff. More recently, see O’Neill 2002. 
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The greater the extent to which a given role places one or more of these demands, the 
greater the responsibility inherent in the role. Equally, we might say that the better an 
agent fulfils each of the dimensions of responsible activity just described, the more she, 
or it, can truly be described as responsible. 
One final remark. What I have said may seem incautiously optimistic concerning the 
division of powers and responsibilities within modern societies – as if it were relatively 
straightforward for most of us to meet the many different demands upon us. I think most 
readers will agree that our experience is much more ambivalent that this: that 
responsibility often makes considerable demands of us, sometimes even impossible 
ones. In the previous section I meant to indicate how our societies are relatively 
successful in channelling demands and modes of accountability; in this section, to argue 
why such success is always partial and sometimes parlous. Precisely because our 
institutions are imperfect, in their divisions of responsibilities as in other regards, is the 
responsibility of individual and collective agents so badly called for – in enforcing 
demands that others might neglect, in meeting demands that would otherwise go 
unenforced, in noticing demands that fall through the organisational gaps.  
Conclusion 
In part, my task has been to explain the modernity of responsibility. More important, 
however, I have wanted to justify the importance we attach to it, and to locate it among 
the moral achievements of modern liberal societies. I have not denied that there may be 
a basis for talking about responsibility wherever human beings bring their concern and 
initiative to bear on their situation. Philosophers, of course, have always had reason to 
enquire into the moral agency that is a precondition of this concern, and into the 
responsibility for past actions that belongs to our agency. We have seen that the virtue 
of responsibility, in turn, depends on basic features of our moral agency – to move 
between different frames of reference, between past and future; likewise, it involves 
answering to others for failures to fulfil our responsibilities. But I also hope to have 
shown how people in modern societies have more reason to demand the virtue of 
responsibility of one another than those in any previous historical period: so extensive, 
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so variegated, so fluid are the demands we make of ourselves, of one another, of our 
organisations. 
I have discussed the virtue of responsibility in very abstract terms, as the readiness to 
respond to a plurality of normative demands. This may be discomforting in at least two 
respects. In the first place, as I stressed above, it leaves a great deal open: which 
demands are valid, which responses appropriate? – I have suggested that a philosophical 
account of responsibility may abstain from closer judgment of these questions. To speak 
of ‘responsible agents’ presupposes that those agents are able to judge, and that where 
they fail to judge rightly, that other agents are qualified to judge this and hold them 
responsible. I have left a great deal open because so much is the prerogative of 
responsible agents themselves. 
We might also feel some discomfort for a second, rather different reason. My argument 
has linked an agent’s capacity to manifest responsibility to particular, contingent 
conditions of society and politics. This implies, then, that responsibility may fail, 
despite an agent’s own best intentions. A will to respond to the plurality of normative 
demands faced is, I have suggested, not enough: there must also be ability. This is partly 
a question of the capacities an agent brings to the situation: an individual’s imagination, 
perseverance, judgment and so on; an organisation’s resources, flexibility, managerial 
capability and so forth. But to be able to manifest responsibility also requires the 
cooperation of one’s circumstances; thus the crucial role of modern institutions in 
delimiting spheres of responsibility and defining relations of accountability. This 
vulnerability of responsibility to circumstances seems to me appropriate. The virtue of 
responsibility emerges from our accountability to, and dependence on, one another. 
Where mutuality fails, then, no surprise that responsibility falters too. In other words: 
responsibility is not quite the property of an individual that we may think of when we 
speak of a virtue. Responsibility reveals not only our material and organisational 
interdependence upon each other, but also, I should like to say, our moral 
interdependence. 
A final point is also striking. Unlike many other virtues, responsibility is a virtue of 
collectivities as well as individuals. Despite the profound differences between 
individual and collective agency, about which I have been able to say nothing here, 
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there is a remarkable symmetry: almost everything that one can say about the 
responsible person can be said of the responsible organisation. I have argued that the 
responsible organisation and the responsible individual depend profoundly on one 
another, by virtue of the roles that both create and both fulfil. Both, in turn, depend upon 
a wider fabric of responsible institutions, that involves networks of accountability and 
divisions of responsibilities. The symmetry between responsibility as individual and 
organisational virtue reflects this mutual dependence of individual and collective, when 
responsibility is manifested among us. 
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